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Summary
1. Introduction
Despite all the public attention it received, the June 
28-29 EU Summit will not make it into history books. 
There had been hopes that this European Council 
would be an important milestone on the path to 
elaborating a ‘win-win package deal’ reflecting the 
distinct interests and concerns of all member states 
– but it was not. It made progress, but it failed to live 
up to expectations, even though major issues for the 
future of Europe were up for discussion: migration, 
Economic and Monetary Union reform, security and 
Despite all the public attention it received, the June EU 
Summit will not make it into history books. It did not 
live up to the expectations raised when the Leaders’ 
Agenda was adopted in October 2017, even though 
major issues for the future of Europe were up for 
discussion: migration, Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) reform, security and defence.
At the end of 2017, hopes rose that EU leaders might 
attempt to – and succeed in – overcoming blockages 
and red lines to elaborate a ‘win-win package deal’ 
(as advocated by the New Pact for Europe project) 
reflecting the distinct interests and concerns of all 
member states. The June Summit was expected to be an 
important milestone on this path – but it was not.
The EU27 failed to achieve structural progress in 
key areas, for now at least. On migration, EU leaders 
avoided disaster by averting the Italian threat to block 
agreement on joint conclusions. But the results were 
mixed and the outcome unclear, and much more needs 
to be done in the coming months and years to advance 
the external dimension and reform the internal 
dimension of the EU’s migration, asylum and refugee 
policy. On EMU reform, the summit results were 
sobering, and it is questionable whether the Euro19 
will have the political will and appetite to step up 
their efforts and agree on more substantial reform by 
the end of 2018. On security and defence, the Summit 
defence. EU leaders once again postponed many critical 
decisions until the end of 2018, and there are serious 
doubts that they will be able to reach worthwhile 
compromises ahead of the May 2019 European 
elections. The window of opportunity is closing quickly, 
and a significant number of governments do not 
seem eager to seek solutions. Even among those that 
aspire to make progress in the coming months, there 
are question marks over whether they will have the 
political capital, will, courage and clout to do so. 
Conclusions were neither surprising nor ground-
breaking, but they demonstrated again that there is a 
broad consensus among member states on the need to 
enhance security and defence cooperation and assume 
more responsibility at regional and global level. But 
it is still unclear whether governments have enough 
ambition and determination to implement what they 
have agreed in recent years and at the June Summit.
EU leaders (again) postponed many key decisions to 
the end of 2018, and there are serious doubts that they 
will be able to reach worthwhile compromises ahead 
of the May 2019 European elections. The window of 
opportunity is closing quickly, and a significant number 
of governments do not seem eager to seek solutions. 
Even among those that aspire to make progress in the 
coming months, there are question marks over whether 
they will have the political capital, will, courage and 
clout to do so.
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Despite all the public attention  
it received, the June EU Summit will not 
make it into history books. 
The June Summit was expected to be  
an important milestone – but it was not.
Despite all these difficulties, there is no reason to 
despair. The EU and its members can and should 
continue working on an ambitious but pragmatic 
package deal, even if the summit underlined just how 
difficult it is to reach compromises. It is unclear whether 
they will be able to agree on a set of substantial reforms 
before the current window of opportunity closes at 
the end of the year. Time is running out. But one thing 
seems inevitable: they will pay a high price if they 
opt instead to kick the can further down the road and 
continue to muddle through passively.
2. Expectations on the way to the June Summit
When the Leaders’ Agenda was unveiled in October 2017, 
there were (high) hopes that the June 2018 Summit would 
be a decisive moment to push Europe forward. There 
was a spirit of renewed optimism regarding Europe’s 
future and hopes that a potential window of opportunity 
might open after elections in France and Germany. 
Three critical topics for the future of Europe were on the 
agenda: migration, EMU reform, security and defence, and 
many in the EU institutions and a good number of those 
dealing with European affairs in national capitals thought 
that this might be the right moment to forge a bolder 
compromise between the EU27.
But optimism gradually faded as the months passed, 
with growing doubts that the June Summit would 
deliver decisive results. Delays in forming a new 
coalition government in Germany; increasing divisions 
between member states on key policy issues; Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s hesitation in responding to President 
Emmanuel Macron’s reform proposals; a growing 
perception that many governments were sceptical that 
the time was ripe for more ambitious European reforms; 
and, last but certainly not least, a rising number of 
governments including EU-critical or even Eurosceptic 
parties throughout Europe. All these factors dampened 
expectations for the June meeting of the European Council.
 
At the same time, there were strong pressures and some 
positive developments pushing the EU27 to go beyond 
their political comfort zone: increasing geopolitical and 
economic uncertainties as a result of US President Donald 
Trump’s actions aimed at dividing and destabilising the 
EU; heightened fears about the potential consequences 
of the new Italian government for the euro’s stability; 
uncertainties over Europe’s future after Brexit; the 
agreement between President Macron and Chancellor 
Merkel on joint EU reform proposals laid down in the 
Meseberg Declaration just before the summit. All these 
factors increased the need, and maybe even the potential, 
to deliver more promising results at the EU leaders’ 
meeting in June.
The pressure increased in the immediate run-up to the 
Summit. The unexpected political crisis in Germany, as a 
result of a political stand-off between Chancellor Merkel 
and Germany’s Interior Minister Horst Seehofer and 
others in the Bavarian CSU, raised the political stakes. 
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When the Leaders’ Agenda was unveiled  
in	October	2017,	there	were	(high)	hopes	
that the June 2018 Summit would be a 
decisive moment to push Europe forward. 
In an attempt to enhance the anti-migration profile 
of the CSU vis-à-vis the Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD) ahead of regional elections in Bavaria in October, 
Minister Seehofer threatened to close Germany’s borders 
unilaterally to reduce ‘secondary movements’ by asylum-
seekers already registered in other member states. He said 
he would only abstain from doing so if there was EU-wide 
agreement by early July 2018 to introduce more effective 
controls on secondary movements or equivalent measures 
to achieve the same goal. Not only did this ultimatum 
undermine Chancellor Merkel’s political authority, but 
it also risked a potential split between the CDU and the 
CSU. It could have led to the still very young federal grand 
coalition government imploding, probably ending the 
13-year-old chancellorship of Angela Merkel and resulting 
Three things would happen as a result of this.
q  First, failure to deliver effective responses in the 
framework of a convincing package deal would 
further increase fragmentation and distrust among 
the EU27 – and trust is a very valuable but scarce 
commodity today.
q  Second, if the EU cannot make progress, it runs the 
risk that its defences will (again) be too weak to 
weather future storms – and new turbulences will 
occur, although we do not know when, where and 
how they will hit us.
q  Third, and most importantly, a lack of political will, 
courage, determination and leadership will play into 
the hands of anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migration, 
and anti-liberal forces. Political forces pushing our 
societies in a different direction will cheer and gain 
even more support among disillusioned voters at 
the European elections in May 2019, if those who 
defend liberal values and pluralist societies are not 
able to table a convincing narrative about the future 
of Europe on the basis of concrete results and 
credible objectives.
The time to deliver is now. That is why the inability 
to exploit the current window opportunity would 
not only affect the EU – the potential consequences 
would go much deeper, further challenge the pillars 
of our open liberal democracies and increase the 
polarisation of our societies, which is the fertile 
ground on which extremists and authoritarian 
populists thrive.
3.  A hard-fought deal on migration and asylum: 
many questions and much to do
After Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte threatened 
to veto the European Council Conclusions and all-night 
talks lasting almost nine hours, President Donald Tusk 
declared via Twitter at 4.34 AM that EU leaders had 
reached an agreement. The compromise, papered over 
huge differences between governments, strikes a balance 
between the concerns and demands of frontier countries 
in the south of Europe and the interests of those not 
experiencing large numbers of people arriving at their 
shores/borders. The migration deal struck at the Summit 
is mixed and imbalanced in terms of its content, and 
much more needs to be done in the coming months 
and years to boost the Union’s migration, asylum and 
refugee policy.
On the one hand, EU leaders avoided disaster by averting 
the threatened veto of the summit conclusions, and 
they did take a number of decisions, although these 
compromises failed to move beyond the lowest common 
denominator. They agreed to:
q  introduce new mechanisms, including so-called 
“disembarkation platforms” and “voluntary 
controlled centres”;
q  enhance Frontex;
q  step up support for neighbouring countries and 
regions; and
q  speed up work on the remaining parts of a legislative 
package aimed at reforming the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS).
At the time of writing, it seemed likely that this 
combination of measures would ease political tensions 
in Berlin and thus enable Chancellor Merkel to stay in 
power (at least for the time being).
The June Summit showed more clearly than at any point 
since 2015 that member states are putting a strong 
emphasis on securing Europe’s external borders and 
making sure the numbers arriving in the EU remains 
low. In this area at least, the governments of the EU27 
can strike compromises, declaring in the Summit 
Conclusions that the EU is determined to “prevent a 
The June Summit showed more clearly 
than at any point since 2015 that member 
states are putting a strong emphasis on 
securing Europe’s external borders and 
making sure the numbers arriving  
in the EU remains low. 
5
in a severe political crisis and vacuum in the biggest 
and most influential EU member state, with potentially 
adverse consequences beyond Germany.
It could also have had a knock-on effect at EU level: 
Austria and other countries were already threatening to 
close their borders, which would have shaken the basic 
foundations of Schengen. It could have also motivated 
Italy and other ‘first arrival’ countries to stop registering 
migrants and asylum-seekers, leading in turn to chaotic 
developments and severe negative effects on Europe’s 
migration, asylum and refugee policy. Ironically, 
this knock-on effect would have happened at a time 
when the EU is no longer experiencing an immediate 
migration/refugee crisis, with illegal border crossings 
into the EU down by 96% from their peak in October 
2015.
A ‘mini-summit’ organised by the European Commission 
on the Sunday before the Summit involving the leaders 
of 16 member states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the Netherlands) failed to make sufficient headway, 
further increasing the pressure to achieve progress at the 
ordinary June Summit and throw a political lifeline to the 
German Chancellor. 
The pressure intensified still further when new Italian 
Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte threatened to veto the 
Summit Conclusions if other governments would not 
agree to a “radical change” in the Dublin principle. The 
latter makes frontline countries such as Italy responsible 
for dealing with asylum claims and allows for registered 
asylum seekers that move to another EU country to be 
sent back to the one they arrived in. All this increased 
public and media interest in the Summit, although with 
few expectations that EU leaders would be able to strike a 
substantial deal in this area.
As a result, the migration issue dominated the Summit 
and overshadowed a very long list of other issues on 
the agenda: EMU reform; security and defence; jobs, 
growth and competitiveness; innovation and digital; the 
Macedonian name issue; enlargement; the downing of 
MH-17; sanctions against Russia; the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2021-2027; Brexit; and the EP’s 
composition after the 2019 elections. 
More solidarity would enable the EU to 
live up to its international and European 
obligations and avoid becoming  
an inhumane ‘fortress Europe’.
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return to the uncontrolled flows of 2015” and to “further 
stem illegal migration”. Provided that the Union can 
implement the measures and innovations adopted at 
the Summit in practice, they could help to keep numbers 
down – but they are not enough by far.
Many issues and questions related to the proposed 
innovations remain open, and it is unclear whether 
they will ever be successfully implemented. More 
fundamentally, the EU27 still cannot agree on
proposals to enhance solidarity between member
states. They continue to struggle to find a consensus on 
the internal reforms of the CEAS and the June Summit 
was (again) unable to make progress on reforming the 
Dublin regulation.
A significant number of governments, led by those in 
power in Hungary and Poland, resist any kind of (flexible) 
solidarity mechanisms obliging them to take a greater 
share of the burden, especially when it comes to dividing 
asylum-seekers and refugees among EU countries. Those 
on the other side of the political divide, including many 
governments and EU institutions, still hope that actions 
designed to safeguard the Union’s external border 
and reduce illegal migration will eventually create the 
preconditions for a deal on solidarity among members 
states and with those knocking on Europe’s doors – 
thus enabling the EU to live up to its international and 
European obligations and values and avoid becoming an 
inhumane ‘fortress Europe’.
It is, however, by no means certain that this can be 
done, and this is driving an increased momentum to 
forge coalitions of the ‘willing and able’, even if this 
would imply that some ‘unwilling’ member states will 
be left behind or (seen from the perspective of potential 
‘outs’) spared from increasing efforts to show solidarity. 
However, it is not clear whether such ‘differentiated 
solidarity’ will materialise in the months and years to 
come. The readiness of member states, other than the 
countries of first arrival, to set up “controlled centres” on 
their territory will be another test of whether the ‘willing 
and able’ are ready to assume an even greater share of 
the burden.
than 60 million people have fled their homes and 
around 20 millions of them are currently in the Union’s 
immediate neighbourhood. Although over 80% of the 
world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries, 
Europe is – and will continue to be – an attractive 
destination for many. So, the EU27 will be obliged to 
overcome their differences. But there are no silver 
bullets or shortcuts, so member states will continue to 
struggle to come up with adequate and effective internal 
and external responses.
The results of the June Summit are only one step on 
a long journey. It makes sense to have a closer look at 
them to assess the extent to which they move things in 
the right direction. 
3.1  ESTABLISHMENT OF “DISEMBARKATION 
PLATFORMS”
Aimed at undermining illegal migration and reducing 
the loss of life, the European Council “calls” on the 
Council and the Commission to “swiftly explore” 
the concept of so-called “regional disembarkation 
platforms”, set up in “close cooperation” with the 
UNHCR and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), who presented a detailed proposal 
for a “regional cooperative arrangement ensuring 
predictable disembarkation and subsequent processing 
of persons rescued-at-sea” ahead of the Summit. 
The basic idea is that people saved in search and rescue 
missions (i.e. before they reach the EU’s external 
borders) would be taken to these platforms outside EU 
territory to be ‘processed’ with a view to distinguishing 
economic migrants from those in need of international 
protection. Pressure to find more effective solutions had 
increased in the days ahead of the Summit, after the 
new government in Rome refused to allow rescue ships 
to disembark people rescued in the Mediterranean in 
Italian ports. 
The creation of “disembarkation platforms” should
not be confused with other proposals suggesting,
for example:
q  the creation of facilities outside the EU to send 
asylum-seekers whose claims have been rejected by 
the EU;
q  the establishment of “processing centres” outside 
Europe where asylum-seekers would have to go 
if they want to claim international protection, so 
applications for asylum would no longer be filed on 
EU territory; or
q  the idea of sending asylum-seekers, who have 
already arrived in the EU, to facilities outside 
Europe even before their asylum claims have been 
processed. All these ideas would be incompatible 
with international and European law.
The wording of the final Summit Conclusions was 
softened, with earlier drafts stating that the European 
Council “supports” the establishment of these platforms, 
whereas the final version merely calls on the Council 
and Commission to “explore” the concept. This reflects 
But one thing is certain: the June EU Summit might 
have bought time, but much more needs to be done in 
the months and years to come. Although the numbers 
arriving have sharply decreased since 2015/2016, 
migration pressures will not disappear. The issue 
will continue to dominate national debates in many 
countries inside and outside Europe. Worldwide, more 
Where will the EU be able to convince 
non-EU countries in Africa or the 
Western Balkans to host “disembarkation 
platforms”?	
The European Council would not have 
been able to agree on joint conclusions on 
migration if the proposal to establish the 
voluntary “controlled centres” had not been 
added	to	the	final	text.	
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doubts in a number of EU countries as to whether they 
are practically feasible and could be created in full 
respect of international and European law under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the EU 
Asylum Procedures Directive.
There are a number of other practical and legal 
issues that need to be solved before “disembarkation 
platforms” could be successfully set up:
q  Where will they be established, and will the EU 
be able to attract/convince non-EU countries 
in Africa or the Western Balkans to host 
“disembarkation	platforms”? Some potential 
countries, including Tunisia and Albania, have 
already declared that they are not willing to do so. 
Most third countries fear that such centres could 
attract migrants, with large numbers of people 
ending up stranded on their territory.
q  Who would be ‘allowed’ to search for and rescue 
migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea 
before	they	are	brought	to	these	platforms? 
Elsewhere in the Summit Conclusions, EU 
leaders state that “all vessels” operating in the 
Mediterranean must “respect the applicable laws and 
not obstruct the operation of the Libyan Coastguard”. 
But this does clarify who would be allowed to 
transfer people to the platforms. In this context, one 
should remember that the European Court of Human 
Rights precludes the pushback of people rescued by 
European vessels. 
q  Assuming there will be more than one 
“disembarkation platform”, where would those 
rescued	be	taken? Will they ‘simply’ be transferred 
to the nearest facility or will there be a separate 
mechanism to determine which platform will 
welcome them?
q  Who will assess whether people arriving in these 
facilities are really in need of international 
protection? The asylum agencies of member states 
(with very different asylum systems producing very 
different outcomes for applicants); a newly-created 
EU asylum agency (with common procedures and 
standards for processing claims); or the UNHCR? The 
latter option seems most likely, but does the UNHCR 
have the financial and staff resources to undertake 
this task and would the EU be ready/able to support 
these efforts adequately? 
q  Will the EU be able to give partner countries 
some assurances that it will resettle those 
deemed to be in need of international 
protection? Is it likely that member states will in 
the current political climate be ready to provide 
sufficient resettlement places? Which EU countries 
will be prepared to accept them and on the basis 
of what (binding) criteria/quotas will they be 
distributed among member states? How quickly 
would successful claimants be moved to EU territory?
q  Who will effectively monitor and assure that the 
conditions at “disembarkation platforms” respect 
humanitarian	standards? The experience of recent 
years has shown that the EU struggles to uphold 
basic rules within its borders. 
q  Experience in the member states also shows that 
many asylum applications are denied because the 
claimant is deemed to be an economic migrant – 
what will happen to those whose asylum claims 
are	denied? Will they stay in the country hosting a 
“disembarkation platform” (which these countries 
fear) or will the EU and IOM be able to ensure they 
can be returned to their countries of origin?
q  Setting up and operating disembarkation platforms 
will be costly, so will the Union and its members 
be	ready	to	come	up	with	the	necessary	means? 
And will all EU countries be prepared to contribute if 
the finances come from outside the EU budget?
q  Last but not least, do “disembarkation platforms” 
risk increasing the “pull factor” and thus 
increase the number of people trying to reach 
Europe,	as	some	member	states	fear? Would the 
creation of such facilities really break the people 
smugglers’ business model or would those who seek 
to reach the EU not pay smugglers to help them to do 
so via the new “disembarkation platforms”? 
3.2  CREATION OF VOLUNTARY “CONTROLLED 
CENTRES” WITHIN THE EU
Following a proposal supported by France, Italy and 
Spain, the European Council also agreed that those who 
are “saved” on EU territory should be transferred to so-
called “controlled centres” set up in the member states. 
These centres shall be created on a “voluntary basis” 
with “full EU support” to distinguish between “irregular 
migrants”, who shall be returned, and those in need of 
international protection, “for whom the principle of 
8solidarity” would apply. Reflecting concerns of the four 
Visegrád governments, all “measures in the context 
of these controlled centres” (including relocation and 
resettlement) will be on a “voluntary basis”.
The European Council would not have been able to 
agree on joint conclusions on migration if the proposal 
to establish the voluntary “controlled centres” had not 
been added to the final text. However, as in the case of 
“disembarkation platforms”, there are a number of issues 
that remain unclear and questions to be answered:
q  Which EU countries will be willing to establish 
such	centres? Only Greece has thus far signalled its 
readiness to do so, raising questions over whether 
these centres would replace already existing 
‘hotspots’. Some countries, like France, have already 
rejected setting up “controlled centres” themselves, 
and others, including Germany and Italy, remain 
undecided.
q  What would “controlled” actually mean in 
practice? How long would migrants, refugees or 
asylum-seekers remain in these centres and what 
would be done to make sure that asylum proceedings 
are short and do not take as long as they have, for 
example, in Greek and Italian hotspots?
q  How many of those saved on EU territory would 
be	transferred	to	these	centres? Would the new 
mechanism apply to all of them or merely to a 
selected group of people? 
q  Would those countries unwilling to set up 
“controlled	centres”	(be	obliged	to)	support	
others in doing so and, if so, how would they 
(have	to)	contribute?
q  Will these centres be able to ensure rapid and 
fair processing of asylum claims and the return 
of those rejected to their countries of origin 
or to other third countries where their rights 
will	be	fully	respected? Will the creation of these 
centres be accompanied by the conclusion of effective 
readmission agreements with countries of origin 
and transit? And will the EU be ready to provide the 
necessary incentives for third countries to make this 
happen, including more channels for legal migration?
q  What would happen to people deemed to be in 
need	of	protection? Would their claims be processed 
in the country hosting the respective controlled 
centre” or would they be transferred back to the 
member state that “saved” them? 
q  Finally, is it possible that the creation of 
voluntary	“controlled	centres”	would	(to	some	
extent)	eliminate	the	need	to	relocate	people	
among	EU	countries?	But how can this be the case, 
if member states, like France, German and others, who 
are not first-arrival countries and not willing to create 
such centres? If they would be ready to establish such 
centres, they could (further) reduce the burden from 
countries like Italy, Greece, Spain or Bulgaria. 
3.3  MORE FLEXIBLE FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS
Following a proposal made by President Tusk, EU 
leaders have underlined the need for more “flexible 
instruments” in the context of the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), allowing for “fast 
disbursement” of funds to combat illegal migration. 
These funds should, in future EU budgets from 2021 
onwards, include “significant components” for external 
(not internal!) migration management.
3.4 ENHANCEMENT OF FRONTEX
The European Council reiterated the need to further 
strengthen the role of Frontex through “increased 
resources” and an “enhanced mandate”. However, 
EU leaders did not specify what this would mean in 
concrete terms. The Summit Conclusions do not refer 
to a Commission proposal to strengthen border control 
by enabling the European Border and Coast Guard to 
deploy 10,000 border guards (instead of 1,500 now), 
boosting its powers in the field of return and allowing it 
to operate fully in partner countries outside the EU.
3.5 SECONDARY MOVEMENTS
On the issue most heavily disputed within the German 
government, the Summit Conclusions state, in line 
with one of Chancellor Merkel’s main arguments, that 
secondary movements of asylum-seekers between 
member states “risk jeopardising the integrity” of the 
CEAS and the Schengen acquis. However, EU leaders 
did not specify in concrete terms how to address this 
challenge. The Conclusions merely state that member 
states should take all “necessary internal legislative and 
administrative measures” to counter such movements 
and should “closely cooperate” with each other.
This indicates that governments should seek bilateral 
and/or trilateral agreements between themselves on 
how to counter and reduce secondary movements, 
while fully respecting European norms. The Greek and 
Spanish prime ministers have already declared their 
readiness to conclude agreements to take back asylum-
seekers already registered in their countries. Chancellor 
Merkel also announced at her press conference after the 
Summit that there are other governments which have 
signalled their readiness to reach such agreements with 
Germany, strengthening her hand in the battle with 
her interior minister. Furthermore, the conclusion of 
bi- or trilateral agreements could not only help to deal 
with secondary movements but could also enable the 
voluntary relocation of asylum seekers in line with the 
logic of ‘differentiated solidarity’.
The Commission has also proposed a number of 
additional measures on secondary movements. These 
include:
q  revising the Reception Conditions Directive, allowing 
member states to deny housing and money to asylum 
There is no mention in the Summit  
Conclusions of the need to create  
more	legal	avenues	of	(economic)	
migration and reform EU policies.
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seekers they are not responsible for and to impose 
residency restrictions by compelling migrants to live 
in a specific place; and
q  a reinforced Eurodac fingerprinting database  
to facilitate returns at the border.
3.6  SUPPORT FOR TURKEY, AFRICA AND THE 
WESTERN BALKANS
The European Council reiterated its readiness to support 
third countries and regions to try to ensure that these 
partners continue to support the EU in keeping the 
numbers of people arriving and staying in Europe as low 
as possible. 
Concerning Turkey, EU leaders state that “additional 
efforts” are needed to fully implement the EU-Turkey 
Statement of March 2016 to prevent new crossings from 
Turkey to Bulgaria and Greece (which have increased 
in recent months) and to bring the remaining flows 
to a halt. In return, the European Council agreed to 
launch the second (€3 billion) tranche of the Facility 
for Refugees in Turkey, which will be financed partly 
from the EU budget (€2 billion) and partly through 
contributions from EU countries based on their share  
of the Union’s gross national income (€1 billion).
Regarding Africa, the Summit Conclusions reiterate that 
tackling the “migration problem” requires an enhanced 
partnership aimed at a “substantial socio-economic 
transformation” of the continent. These efforts should 
build on the “principles and objectives” defined by the 
African Union in its Agenda 2063, a strategic framework 
for the socio-economic transformation of the continent 
over the next 50 years. EU leaders agreed to transfer  
€500 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) 
to the EU Trust Fund for Africa and called on member 
states to fulfil their promises to contribute further to 
the Fund “with a view to its replenishment”. But as 
with previous European Council statements, EU leaders 
underline that more development funding is not enough.
There is also a need to substantially increase private 
investment from African and European sources, with a 
particular focus on “education, health, infrastructure, 
innovation, good governance and women’s empowerment”. 
There is, however, no mention in the Summit Conclusions 
of the need to create more legal avenues of (economic) 
migration and reform EU policies – including the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the Common Commercial Policy and 
the Common Fisheries Policy – that negatively impact on 
countries of origin and transit.
With respect to the Western Balkans, the Summit 
Conclusions (once again) state that cooperation 
and support for partners in the region remain key to 
exchange information on migratory flows, prevent 
illegal migration, strengthen border protection 
capacities, and improve return and readmission 
procedures.
3.7  REFORM OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM SYSTEM
EU leaders underline the need to find a “speedy 
solution” to the CEAS legislative reform package, 
which sets minimum standards for the treatment of 
all asylum-seekers and applications across the Union. 
Under current rules, asylum-seekers are treated very 
unequally, and the share of positive asylum decisions 
varies greatly across the EU regarding both speed and 
recognition rates.
Five of the seven legislative proposals on asylum reform 
(Receptions Conditions; Asylum Qualification; Asylum 
Agency; Eurodac; Resettlement Framework) initiated 
by the Commission in 2015 are almost ready to be 
concluded by the European Parliament and Council.  
On the remaining two – related to:
q  the reform of the Dublin System, which aims to 
create a system for allocating asylum applications 
among member states; and
q  the Asylum Procedures, which aims to reduce 
differences in recognition rates, discourage 
secondary movements and ensure common effective 
procedural guarantees for asylum seekers – member 
states are struggling to reach agreement.
The European Council thus calls on the Council to 
continue its work “with a view to concluding as soon
as possible”.
The Commission had proposed that the Summit 
Conclusions should call for the adoption of the five 
already agreed proposals by the end of July 2018, 
but this did not find its way into the final text, 
demonstrating the reluctance of some member states 
to make progress on asylum reform. A progress report 
will be presented at the October summit, but an explicit 
call for the Austrian Presidency to “continue work” 
which was included in earlier drafts was not in the final 
version of the European Council Conclusions.
This call is a tiny step towards having 
an honest debate and concrete 
decisions about EDIS.
It	is	not	clear	which	issues	will	(or	will	
not)	be	discussed	in	December	when	
EU leaders will come back to the topic 
of EMU reform.
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4. Future of EMU: no significant decisions (yet?)
The main item discussed on Day 2 of the June Summit 
was the future of EMU. It was supposed to be the first 
thorough debate at the highest political level in years, 
but EU leaders concentrated on a very limited number 
of issues instead of having a comprehensive and in-
depth exchange on the wide array of potential euro area 
reforms. The final statement is very short, and leaders 
agreed to come back to the issue in December (a proposal 
from President Macron to have another Euro Summit in 
October was rejected). In sum, the result of the June Euro 
Summit is sobering, and it remains to be seen whether 
governments will have the political will and appetite 
to move forward and whether the EURO19 will be able 
to overcome their marked differences to agree on more 
substantial EMU reform by the end of this year.
In line with the Leaders’ Agenda and as agreed in 
December 2017, the Euro Summit (meeting in an inclusive 
format also involving non-euro countries) took decisions 
related to the completion of the Banking Union and 
further development of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The exchange also involved European Central 
Bank President Mario Draghi and Eurogroup President 
Mario Centeno, who had written to President Tusk in 
the days before the Summit setting out some potential 
elements for a further deepening of EMU, reflecting and 
summarising discussions in the Eurogroup while also 
highlighting a significant number of major differences 
among the EURO19. 
Centeno’s letter takes the Franco-German initiative agreed 
in the framework of the Meseberg Declaration into account 
but also mirrors strong criticism from a large number 
of mostly northern euro countries (the so-called “new 
Hanseatic league”, led by the Netherlands) of the joint 
proposals made by Chancellor Merkel and President Macron. 
They are particularly critical of the idea of introducing a 
“Eurozone budget”, which Berlin and Paris agreed on in 
principle, without however specifying details on its overall 
size, precise functions, governance or funding mechanism. 
Critics of the idea fear that it could:
q  grow over time and eventually lead to a transfer union; 
and
q  send the wrong signal to the Union’s deficit-prone 
countries, (further) undermining their reform readiness 
at national level.
to “come back to these issues” in December, without 
specifying which topics they will concentrate on then. This 
delay came as no surprise, given that the Franco-German 
initiative was adopted only ten days before the Summit.
On completing the Banking Union, the Euro Summit 
Statement declares that work should start on a “roadmap 
for beginning political negotiations” on the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) once co-legislators have 
adopted the banking package by the end of 2018. This 
call is a tiny step towards having an honest debate and 
concrete decisions about EDIS. It signals that a significant 
number of euro countries, including Germany, are still 
very sceptical about the idea.
On further development of the European Stability 
Mechanism, the Euro Summit (unsurprisingly) agreed on 
two things:
q  The Mechanism will provide the common backstop to 
the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); and
q  The ESM will be strengthened “working on the basis 
of all elements of an ESM reform” as set out in the 
Eurogroup President’s letter. However, decisions on 
the details have again been postponed until December.
Meanwhile, the Eurogroup will prepare the “terms of 
reference” for the common backstop and agree on a 
“term sheet” for the ESM’s further development. In more 
concrete terms, the EURO19 still have to decide when the 
common backstop will be put in place, how big it will be, 
and which governance structures shall apply if decisions 
on its use need to be taken in future.
From a more general perspective, the Euro Summit 
Statement is very vague. It is not clear which issues will 
(or will not) be discussed in December when EU leaders 
will come back to the topic of EMU reform. However, the 
list of potential issues is very long, and the positions of 
national capitals vary immensely.
A look at the Meseberg Declaration, the Commission’s 
EMU reform proposals and President Centeno’s letter 
underlines the diversity of potential issues to be tackled 
related to EMU reform, including, among others:
q  a stronger role for the ESM in designing and 
monitoring programmes in liaison with the 
Commission and the ECB (Centeno letter);
There was no in-depth discussion on the overall future 
of EMU at the Euro Summit. Instead, EU leaders decided 
EU leaders have kicked the can back  
to the Eurogroup without giving it clear 
political guidance. 
The jury is still out on the extent to 
which	Macron	(and	Merkel?)	will	fight	
for	a	further	solidification	of	Europe’s	
currency and whether these struggles 
will produce tangible results.
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q  a further development of the precautionary ESM 
credit line (PCCL) to be used as a tool to fight 
contagion if ESM members risk a gradual loss of 
market access, without the need for a full programme 
(Meseberg; Centeno letter);
q  the ESM’s capacity to assess the economic 
situation in member states (without overlapping with 
the Commission’s role) (Centeno letter);
q  the potential introduction of Collective Action 
Clauses	(CACs)	with	single-limb	aggregation into 
sovereign bonds contracts, facilitating a restructuring 
of sovereign debt while giving the ESM an IMF-like 
role in facilitating debtor-creditor negotiations 
(Meseberg; Centeno letter);
q  the establishment of a European Investment 
Stabilisation Function to mobilise up to €30 billion in 
loans to help stabilise public investment levels and 
facilitate rapid economic recovery in cases of large 
asymmetric shocks, on the basis of strict eligibility 
criteria (Commission);
q  the potential establishment of a European 
Unemployment Stabilisation Fund in case of severe 
economic crises (on the basis of loans, not transfers) 
(Meseberg; Centeno letter);
q  the introduction of a Reform Support Programme 
able to provide financial and technical support for 
priority reforms in all EU member states, with a 
targeted facility for countries wishing to join the euro 
area (Commission);
q  the integration of the substance of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal 
Compact) into EU law (Commission);
q  a further reduction of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
on EU banks’ balance sheets through a package of 
initiatives (Commission);
q  external representation of the euro area through the 
progressive establishment of a unified representation 
in the IMF (Commission);
q  introduction of a European Minister of Economy and 
Finance (Commission); and, last but certainly not least,
q  the introduction of a multiannual “Eurozone 
budget” within the EU framework to promote 
competitiveness, convergence and stabilisation  
in the euro, starting in 2021 (Meseberg).
The above list is not exhaustive and does not reveal 
the depth of the divisions between member states, EU 
institutions, other institutional actors and within the 
expert community. But the plethora of proposals shows 
the variety of potential issues that might be discussed in 
the framework of EMU reform in the months to come – 
provided that the EU and its members have the political 
capital, will, determination and courage to elaborate the 
complex elements of a substantial EMU reform package.
But one thing is clear: despite some remarkable reform 
achievements since the outbreak of the financial and 
euro-area crisis, many of their underlying causes 
remain unresolved, leaving the euro area vulnerable to 
future storms and potential real-life stress tests. The 
EU still has a long way to go to complete EMU. There 
is thus no room for complacency at either European or 
national level. Collective efforts to overcome remaining 
structural deficiencies have, however, lost momentum 
since 2012, with the receding danger of a euro meltdown 
undermining the willingness of many governments to 
overcome deep divisions and take bold decisions.
The June Summit did not mark the beginning of a 
new attempt at the highest political level to agree on 
a set of concrete and compulsory EMU reforms to be 
implemented in the years to come. EU leaders have 
kicked the can back to the Eurogroup without giving it 
clear political guidance. Discussions in the Eurogroup 
will continue, and we will have to wait and see whether 
EU governments and institutions will use the time until 
the end of 2018 to prepare for a real round of debates 
and decisions on further structural reforms of the 
common currency area – or whether this opportunity 
will (once again) be lost.
Failing to progress on EMU reform would be a major 
defeat for President Macron, who has invested 
significant political capital in this and regards advancing 
monetary union as a cornerstone of Europe’s future. 
Strengthening the euro has been at the heart of his 
plans to combat nationalist forces in France and other 
EU countries. The jury is still out on the extent to 
which Macron (and Merkel?) will fight for a further 
solidification of Europe’s currency and whether these 
struggles will produce tangible results. Meanwhile, the 
French President presented himself as an essential 
facilitator at the June Summit on issues related to 
migration. Macron might ask his European Council 
colleagues to return the favour when EU leaders revert 
to the discussions on the future of EMU.
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The third core element of the European Council 
Conclusions relates to security and defence. Unlike 
with migration and EMU reform, EU leaders did not 
have a detailed discussion on this, reflecting the broad 
consensus among member states. Instability in Europe’s 
neighbourhood and uncertainty over US commitment to 
Europe’s security and defence have raised fundamental 
questions about member states’ responsibility for their 
security and the EU’s role in defence matters. However, it 
is still not clear whether member states have the required 
ambition and determination to implement what they have 
agreed in recent years and at the June EU Summit.
As in previous European Council Conclusions, EU 
leaders once again emphasised that Europe must take 
greater responsibility for its security and defence. To 
achieve this, they want the Union to take steps to bolster 
European defence by “enhancing defence investment, 
capability development and operational readiness”. 
With increased pressures from Washington in mind, EU 
leaders emphasise that these initiatives shall strengthen 
the Union’s strategic autonomy while “complementing” 
and “reinforcing” the activities of NATO. The strong 
links between the Union and NATO were also confirmed 
by the fact that EU leaders, once again, had an exchange 
with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at the 
start of the June Summit.
The Summit decisions also sent a clear signal that the 
EU27 might be struggling to move forward on migration 
and asylum policy and EMU reform, but they are united 
and willing to progress in the area of security and 
defence. The broad consensus on security and defence 
matters could also help to coalesce an overall package 
deal, by contributing to a political context conducive to 
a more constructive debate on the future of EMU and 
migration/asylum policy.
Coming back to the concrete decisions of the June 
EU Summit in the area of security and defence, the 
European Council:
q  calls for the fulfilment of commitments agreed in 
the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) and asks the Council to approve a “next 
set of projects” in November 2018. It remains to be 
seen whether the next list of projects will be more 
ambitious and more aligned with the Union’s actual 
capability gaps identified in the recently updated 
Capability Developments Plan;
q  welcomes progress on military mobility in the 
framework of PESCO and EU-NATO cooperation 
and now expects the military requirements under 
the EU Action Plan on military mobility to be 
finalised. It also calls on member states to “simplify 
and standardise relevant rules and procedures” by 
2024. These efforts will be reviewed annually on the 
basis of a report by the Commission and the High 
Representative (starting in spring 2019);
q  calls for the “swift implementation” of the European 
Defence Industrial Development Programme and 
“further progress” on the European Defence Fund 
(EDF) in both its research and capability windows;
q  welcomes the work undertaken to strengthen civilian 
CSDP and calls for an agreement on a “civilian CSDP 
Compact” by the end of 2018;
q  welcomes the Joint Communication on Europe’s 
resilience to hybrid and Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear-related threats, and calls 
for the adoption as soon as possible of a new EU 
“regime of restrictive measures” to address the use 
and proliferation of chemical weapons;
q  invites the High Representative and the Commission 
to present an action plan by December 2018 with 
“specific proposals for a coordinated EU response 
to the challenge of disinformation”, including 
“appropriate mandates and sufficient resources” for 
the relevant EEAS Strategic Communications teams;
q  stresses the need to strengthen capabilities against 
cybersecurity threats from outside the EU;
q  calls for further coordination between member 
states and at EU level and in consultation with 
NATO, to “reduce the threat from hostile intelligence 
activities”;
q  calls for further deepening of EU-NATO cooperation 
including through a new Joint Declaration and the 
“related proposals for action”.
The Summit Conclusions are neither surprising nor 
ground-breaking, but they testify once more to the broad 
consensus between EU member states on enhancing 
cooperation in this area. This reflects the rising number 
of external threats and insecurities facing Europe. Recent 
actions, statements and assertions by President Trump, 
including on NATO, have further increased uncertainties 
about the future of the global multilateral order, increasing 
the need for Europeans to assume more responsibility – 
and more are likely to come. Regional and international 
geopolitical pressures are a strong centripetal force for the 
EU to get its act together and there is broad public support 
for this, with an overwhelming majority of people across 
Europe (around 80%) keen for the EU to assume a more 
active role in world affairs. 
Against this backdrop, the EU and its members have 
made some remarkable progress since 2016, driven 
5.  Security and defence: broad consensus,  
but will EU countries deliver?
The Summit Conclusions are neither 
surprising nor ground-breaking, but they 
testify once more to the broad consensus 
between EU member states on enhancing 
cooperation in the area of defence. 
Despite the progress of recent years, 
there is a need to manage expectations 
concerning the future of European defence 
cooperation. Supranational integration is 
not on the cards, as security lies at the core 
of national sovereignty. 
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6.  Other issues on the agenda
However, the jury is still out as to whether the EU27 
will be able to fulfil the expectations they have raised. 
They still need to demonstrate their determination to 
overcome resistance from various quarters, including 
parts of the political and military establishment 
and national defence industries protecting their 
prerogatives and interests. The challenge is not so 
much to establish new mechanisms and structures, but 
rather to ensure that they deliver and advance Europe’s 
strategic autonomy.
Despite the progress of recent years, there is a need 
to manage expectations concerning the future 
of European defence cooperation. Supranational 
integration is not on the cards, as security lies at the 
core of national sovereignty. The efforts at EU level 
do not aim to constrain national prerogatives, but to 
augment the Union’s added value as a ‘cooperation 
multiplier’. Through economies of scale, the EU 
can help to develop new capabilities and pool them 
in integrated and more deployable multinational 
force packages. But enhancing the Union’s strategic 
autonomy requires more than capabilities; it also 
depends on a joint assessment of risks and priorities 
for action and the conjunction of distinct national 
strategic cultures. The Union has made progress,  
but it still has a long way to go.
by a renewed sense of urgency reflected in the EU 
Global Strategy, and the decisions taken at the June 
European Council continue down this path. The EU27 
are gradually creating mechanisms that pave the way for 
deeper European defence cooperation and to strengthen 
the Union’s strategic autonomy. Despite distinctive 
geopolitical concerns/interests and different strategic 
cultures, member states are more aware than ever 
that they need to deepen cooperation to ensure their 
collective security. Germany’s heightened interest in 
playing a stronger role, the impact of Brexit on Europe’s 
security, mounting military pressures on France, and 
a more ambitious European Commission have all 
contributed to creating more common ground and 
ambition among the member states on progress towards 
stronger defence cooperation. 
But it will take time for all these efforts to produce 
results, and they will ultimately depend on the extent to 
which national governments continue to invest political 
capital and financial resources in a collective effort to 
enhance cooperation. The current momentum needs to be 
maintained to ensure that commitments are implemented 
over time, which has not always been the case in the past. 
Member states still have to prove that they have the will 
and endurance to accomplish this. Progress will depend on 
national leaders driving it through regular discussions at 
the highest political level in the European Council. That is 
why EU leaders have to revert to this issue continuously, as 
they did at this Summit.
EU leaders also discussed and took decisions on a number 
of other more or less significant issues:
6.1 JOBS, GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS
On jobs, growth and competitiveness, the European Council:
q  concludes the 2018 European Semester, endorsing 
the integrated	country-specific	recommendations 
while calling on member states to use the current good 
economic situation to strengthen the reform momentum;
q  reiterates that fair and effective taxation remains a 
key priority and that the fight against tax avoidance, 
evasion and fraud must be vigorously pursued both at 
global level (notably in the OECD) and within the EU;
q  calls on the Council to take work forward on the 
Commission’s proposals on digital taxation;
q  in light of a potential escalation of the trade conflict 
with the current US Administration, underlines 
the importance of preserving and deepening the 
rules-based multilateral system and invites the 
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Commission to propose a comprehensive approach 
to improving the functioning of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO);
q  as part of its positive trade agenda, the EU will 
continue to negotiate ambitious, balanced and 
mutually	beneficial	trade	agreements;
q  asks co-legislators to swiftly adopt the proposal on 
the screening of foreign direct investments;
q  in reaction to Trump’s decision to impose tariffs 
on steel and aluminium products, fully supports 
the rebalancing measures, potential safeguard 
measures to protect EU markets, and the legal 
proceedings at the WTO, as decided on the initiative 
of the Commission.
6.2 INNOVATION AND DIGITAL
On innovation and digital, the Summit Conclusions 
state that:
q  Europe must further develop it high-quality 
research across the EU and turn it into new products, 
services and business models;
q  it is vital to deliver on the remaining legislative proposals 
concerning the Digital Single Market Agenda before the 
end of the current parliamentary cycle;
q  the Commission should work with member states on a 
coordinated plan	on	Artificial	Intelligence;
q  there is a need to improve	access	to	finance	 
for businesses;
q  the Commission shall launch a new pilot initiative 
on breakthrough innovation within the remaining 
period of Horizon 2020; and
q  a European Innovation Council will be set up under 
the next MFF to identify and scale up breakthrough 
and disruptive innovation – a proposal that got a 
political boost when President Macron listed it as one 
of his reform priorities.
6.3  MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE; 
ENLARGEMENT; DOWNING OF MH-17; 
RUSSIA SANCTIONS; MULTIANNUAL 
FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK; BREXIT; AND 
COMPOSITION OF THE EP
On the Macedonian name issue, the European Council 
strongly welcomes and supports the agreement reached 
between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Greece, although there is still a long way to go before it 
becomes a reality.
 On enlargement, EU leaders endorsed the conclusions 
adopted by the General Affairs Council on 26 June, 
including “setting out a path” towards opening accession 
negotiations with Tirana and Skopje in June 2019. This 
decision was taken after intense discussions, with France, 
Denmark and the Netherlands raising strong objections to 
the start of membership talks.
On to the downing	of	Malaysia	Airlines	flight	MH-17 in 
July 2014 in the context of the military stand-off between 
Ukraine and Russia, the European Council reiterated its 
full support for UNSC Resolution 2166 and called on the 
Russian Federation to accept its responsibility and to 
“fully cooperate with all efforts to establish truth, justice 
and accountability”.
On sanctions against Russia, EU leaders extended 
them for another six months until the end of January 
2019 as Moscow has failed to demonstrate complete 
implementation of its commitments in the Minsk 
Agreement and respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. 
During the Summit, Chancellor Merkel and President 
Macron reported on the state of affairs regarding the 
implementation of the Minsk Agreement. 
On the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 
2021-2017, the debate among EU leaders was not on 
substance but rather concentrated on the timing of 
negotiations. The Summit Conclusions merely state 
that the European Council “takes note” of the package 
of MFF proposals presented by the Commission in early 
May 2018 and “invites” the European Parliament and the 
Council to examine these proposals in a “comprehensive 
manner” and “as soon as possible”. It is thus still unclear 
whether the EU27 will attempt to reach a compromise 
before the European elections in May 2019 or if the final 
negotiations on the next MFF will take place in 2020. The 
Commission and some EU leaders, including Chancellor 
Merkel, aspire to an early MFF agreement, but experience, 
very divergent views about Europe’s future budget and 
the loss of funding due to Brexit suggest concluding the 
negotiations by early 2019 is highly ambitious.
The Commission and some EU leaders, 
including Chancellor Merkel, aspire to 
an early MFF agreement, but experience, 
very divergent views about Europe’s future 
budget and the loss of funding due to 
Brexit suggest concluding the negotiations 
by early 2019 is highly ambitious.
 On Brexit, the discussion between the EU27 was very 
short, and once again, there was overwhelming unity 
between leaders – but also an increasing sense of 
urgency. The Conclusions of the European Council Article 
50 meeting issued a strong warning about the slow 
progress in Brexit negotiations: in the words of Dutch 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte: “Time is getting shorter and 
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shorter to get to an agreement. We don’t have time.” 
Following an exchange with Chief Negotiator Michel 
Barnier, who gave EU leaders a presentation on the state 
of talks, the EU27 expressed their concern that there had 
been “no substantial progress” on a backstop solution for 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. They also insisted on the 
need for “intensified efforts” to conclude the Withdrawal 
Agreement, including its provisions on transition, “as 
soon as possible”, to come into effect on the date of 
withdrawal (30 March 2019).
The Conclusions also state that work must be 
accelerated to prepare a political declaration on the 
framework for the future relationship. Aware of the 
serious differences of opinion within the government 
in London, EU leaders call for “further clarity” and 
“realistic and workable proposals” from the UK on 
the future relationship. According to President Tusk: 
“This is the last call to lay the cards on the table.” At 
the same time, the EU27 stated that the Union would 
Some – including those involved in the 
New Pact for Europe project – thought the 
time had come to ‘re-energise Europe’.
be prepared to “reconsider its offer” (in line with its 
principles) if the “UK positions were to evolve”. It is a 
clear message to Prime Minister May and others in the 
UK government that the EU would be prepared to make 
a somewhat better Brexit offer if London softens some 
of its red lines. Aware of the increased danger of a (very) 
hard Brexit, the European Council renewed its call upon 
member states, EU institutions and other stakeholders 
to “step up their work on preparedness” at all levels and 
“for all outcomes”.
On the composition of the European Parliament 
and in accordance with the schedule of the Leaders’ 
Agenda, the European Council took a decision related 
to the 2019-2024 parliamentary term. In line with the 
European Parliament’s proposal, the total number of 
parliamentarians is set at 705, ranging from 6 to 96 
MEPs per member state. Interestingly, the decision also 
specifies what shall happen if UK is still an EU member 
after the May 2019 elections.
7. Next steps and prospects: hope dies last
The June EU Summit avoided the threat of disaster and 
took decisions on a variety of issues. It covered a vast 
number of topics, but it remains to be seen whether what 
has been decided at the Union’s highest political level will 
be implemented in practice. 
In late 2017, there were hopes that the new sense 
of optimism which has spread since the end of 2016 
would spark a new EU momentum. Some – including 
those involved in the New Pact for Europe project – 
thought the time had come to ‘re-energise Europe’, with 
member states attempting and managing to overcome 
blockages and red lines to elaborate a ‘win-win package 
deal’ reflecting the distinct interests and concerns of 
all member states and their citizens; a compromise 
that would move Europe forward in an ambitious but 
pragmatic fashion; a deal that would counter the danger 
of a more illiberal Europe. 
It was hoped that the June Summit would be an important 
milestone on this path – but it was not.
The EU27 have not been able to achieve structural 
progress in crucial areas, at least not up until now. On 
migration, the Union is still struggling to bridge the 
fundamental divide between two camps. On one side are 
those who argue that Europe must, first and foremost, 
counter the sense of insecurity among its citizens and 
protect itself from potentially overwhelming numbers of 
people trying to reach the ‘old continent’. The numbers in 
this ‘security camp’ has grown and they are loudly vocal at 
all levels. On the other side are all those who insist on the 
need to boost solidarity among EU countries, with those 
knocking on Europe’s doors, and with countries of origin 
and transit. Many in this ‘solidarity camp’ agree that more 
needs to be done to enhance security, but also feel that 
this should not lead to an inhumane ‘fortress Europe’ 
betraying its fundamental values and beliefs.
 
Although the pressure of migration has decreased – with 
the numbers arriving in Europe down dramatically since 
the 2015 peak – political and societal divisions between 
and within countries have grown. The political battles 
that took place surrounding and during the June Summit 
clearly showed that the Union is confronted with a much 
deeper political and cultural crisis that threatens one 
of the biggest achievements of European integration – 
Schengen – with potentially grave consequences for the 
entire European project.
The Summit also exposed the continuing divisions 
over the future of Economic and Monetary Union, 
where member states are struggling to balance the 
expectations of two other major camps. On one side is 
the ‘responsibility and competitiveness camp’ who want 
a strict(er) implementation of rules, re-affirmation of 
the ‘no bail-out’ principle, a reduction of risks, more 
market discipline, and greater pressure on EU countries 
to implement long-overdue structural reforms to enhance 
Europe’s global competitiveness in an increasingly 
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challenging and confrontational economic environment. 
On the other side are all those belonging to the ‘solidarity 
and caring camp’, who want more flexible and smarter 
rules with greater discretion, the creation of common 
risk-sharing mechanisms, the introduction of financial 
instruments to support countries suffering from large 
asymmetric economic shocks, more support from the 
European level for national reform efforts, more fiscal 
room for public investment, and actions to (further) 
reduce macroeconomic imbalances. The understanding 
between France and Germany set out in the Meseberg 
Declaration indicate some progress in overcoming this 
fundamental divide, but the June Summit once again 
underlined that the EU27 and the Euro19 will have to 
move further if they want to agree on a concrete and 
compulsory roadmap for additional EMU reforms to be 
implemented in the years to come.
anti-EU, anti-euro, anti-migration rhetoric and policies 
will sustain or increase their political attractiveness and 
power at home. They do not care about Europe; they 
care about themselves. They believe that ‘less Europe’ 
would give them more room for manoeuvre at national 
level – even if this is an illusion in a highly complex and 
interdependent environment in which no European 
country will be able to defend its interests and values on 
its own. 
The key question for EU institutions, governments and 
leaders aspiring to push things forward in Europe is 
whether they have the political capital, will, courage 
and clout to do so. The EU institutions are approaching 
the end of the current political cycle; the political crisis 
in Germany has weakened chancellor Merkel; French 
President Macron is very active and ready to push reforms 
at national and EU level but is facing the lowest levels of 
support since he assumed power in May 2017. Both Merkel 
and Macron know that they need each other and that EU 
reforms will not be possible unless they join forces – this 
is ultimately what led to the Meseberg Declaration. But 
valuable time was lost, and both are aware that levels of 
trust on either side of the Rhine are not very high. They 
also know that there is strong opposition to a further 
deepening of European cooperation even within their 
ranks and in some parts of the electorate. It remains to 
be seen how united they will be in the decisive months to 
come, but without them pushing in the same direction, 
nothing will move at EU level. 
It was hoped that the June Summit would 
be an important milestone – but it was not.
The	June	Summit	(again)	postponed	many	
critical decisions to the end of 2018, and it 
is by no means certain that the EU27 will 
be able to reach a worthwhile compromise 
ahead of the European elections. 
The most obstructive political players  
are in an outright ‘destructive mood’.
Despite all these difficulties, there is still some hope, 
which – as we know – dies last. Even though the EU27 
have been unable to overcome their differences at the 
June European Council, there is no reason to despair. 
The experience of recent years points in a different 
direction. In spite of all the turmoil since 2008, the EU 
has been remarkably resilient in the face of the many 
forces of disintegration fuelled by Europe’s poly-crisis. 
Many prophets of doom have repeatedly predicted the 
Union’s imminent collapse, and they have repeatedly 
Despite these divisions on migration and the EMU, the 
June European Council also showed that cooperation 
in the area of security and defence differs from the two 
other cornerstones of Europe’s future. In this area, there 
are no major ‘opposing camps’ whose difference need to 
be bridged. Yes, there are distinct geopolitical priorities 
and distinct national strategic cultures. But there is a 
strong consensus across Europe that member states need 
to deepen cooperation to defend their interests in an 
increasingly volatile and uncertain regional and global 
environment – a consensus that will further increase if 
President Trump continues to challenge and undermine 
the existing multilateral economic and political order. 
The experience of the recent G7 summit points in that 
direction. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
indisputable need to assume more regional and global 
responsibility will have a positive spill-over effect in the 
areas of migration and EMU reform – the jury is still out.
The June Summit (again) postponed many critical 
decisions to the end of 2018, and it is by no means 
certain that the EU27 will be able to reach a worthwhile 
compromise ahead of the European elections. The 
window of opportunity is closing quickly, and a significant 
number of governments are not eager to seek solutions. 
Some are passive; others are actively obstructing reforms 
for a variety of reasons. Some capitals feel excluded and 
side-lined by the revival of the Franco-German tandem. 
Some, especially outside the euro area, fear a further 
deepening of EMU integration might discriminate their 
countries. Others believe that additional reforms are 
either not necessary or maybe even counterproductive. 
Many do not share a sense of urgency and doubt that 
the current political climate is ripe to enhance levels 
of cooperation at European level. The most obstructive 
political players (inside and outside government) are in 
an outright ‘destructive mood’ hoping that their
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been proved wrong. The EU’s strong foundations can 
explain its resilience: 60 years on, integration has become 
part of Europe’s collective DNA. The many benefits 
of European integration, increasing interdependence 
among member states (especially among those who share 
the same currency), the deep and complex historical, 
political, economic, and societal ties that bind member 
states and citizens, have all made it extremely difficult 
to fundamentally risk or even abandon the European 
project. Most people believe the ‘costs of non-Europe’ 
would be very high and a clear majority of citizens want 
their country to remain in the EU and the euro – and their 
numbers have grown since the Brexit vote. Nobody wants 
to move towards a cliff edge without a parachute.
However, more and more people have turned their 
backs on the EU during the poly-crisis because of their 
dissatisfaction with the current state of the Union. 
They understand the value of European integration 
and cooperation but deplore what the EU has become. 
Although public support for the EU has risen in recent 
years, many in Europe still believe that the Union has not 
been ‘part of the solution’ but rather ‘part of the problem’ 
in the recent spate of crises. Even if the reality is more 
complicated, perceptions matter very much.
This is why the EU must deliver to regain public 
confidence (among both ‘ordinary’ citizens and elites) 
in the added value of European cooperation. This is why 
the EU27 must continue working on an ambitious but 
realistic package deal, even if the June Summit revealed 
how difficult it is to reach the required compromises.
Even though the EU27 have been unable 
to overcome their differences at the June 
European Council, there is no reason  
to despair.
game between governments and even between 
‘ordinary’ people across Europe – north, south, east, 
and west. This blame game will increase if the EU 
and its members are not able to live up to citizens’ 
expectations. Mutual accusations of a lack of solidarity 
have already deepened the divisions in Europe, and 
they would grow if the EU27 fail to make progress. 
Higher levels of fragmentation and distrust between 
EU countries will also negatively affect or even 
preclude the Union’s ability to exploit future windows 
of opportunity to improve EU policies and Europe’s 
institutional construction. What happens today will be 
felt tomorrow.
q  Second:	insufficient	defences	to	face	future	
storms: The poly-crisis is no longer making headlines. 
The EU and its members have, in the past decade, 
achieved things that would have been unfeasible 
before 2008. Nevertheless, the Union has not yet 
been able to make itself ‘future-proof’. New storms 
will come, even if we do not know when, where and 
how they will hit us. If the EU27 cannot exploit the 
current window of opportunity, they run the risk that 
the Union’s defences will not be strong enough to 
weather future turbulence. We should learn from our 
recent past and follow the lessons we were collectively 
taught: the experience of the poly-crisis has clearly 
shown that European cooperation is not an ideology 
but rather a necessity in an interdependent world in 
which individual countries cannot defend their values, 
interests and aspirations alone.
q  Third: a further strengthening of illiberal ‘anti-
forces’: A lack of political will, courage, determination 
and leadership will play into the hands of anti-EU, 
anti-euro, anti-migration, and anti-liberal forces. The 
‘anti-forces’ will cheer if the EU27 put off difficult 
decisions. If they cannot push things forward before 
May 2019, those who want to push our societies 
in a different direction will profit, attracting even 
more support from disillusioned citizens, further 
strengthening their position at EU and national 
level and increasing the danger of a more regressive, 
nationalistic and closed Europe. The political forces 
pushing in this direction are bound to gain support 
at next year’s European elections if those seeking to 
defend liberal values and pluralist societies cannot 
table a convincing narrative about Europe’s on the 
basis of concrete results and credible objectives. 
That is why failure to exploit the current window of 
opportunity would not only affect the EU but go much 
deeper and further, challenge the pillars of our open 
liberal democracies and increase the polarisation of 
our societies, which is the fertile ground on which 
extremists and authoritarian populist thrive. There is 
no time to waste.
Huge doubts remain over whether member states will be 
able to agree on a set of substantial reforms before the 
current window of opportunity will close at the end of 
2018. But one thing seems certain: the EU is bound to 
pay a high price if it is unable to make progress, opts for 
further delay and continues to muddle through.
Three things are inevitable if the EU27 fail to exploit the 
current window of opportunity:
q  First: increased fragmentation and distrust among 
member states: The inability to agree to effective 
responses in the framework of a convincing package 
deal will further enhance the divisions between EU 
countries. This will not only affect political elites in 
national capitals but also societies as a whole. We 
have already witnessed an unprecedented resurgence 
of national stereotypes, nationalistic chauvinism, 
historical resentments, and a damaging blame 
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